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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, the major United States airlines have raised passenger fares 
through coordinated fare-setting when their route networks overlap, 
according to the United States Department of Justice. Through its review of 
company documents and testimony, the Justice Department found that when 
major airlines have overlapping route networks, they respond to rivals’ price 
changes across multiple routes and thereby discourage competition from their 
rivals.1 A recent empirical study reached a similar conclusion: It found that 
fares have increased for this reason on more than 1000 routes nationwide and 
even that American and Delta, two airlines with substantial route overlaps, 
have come close to cooperating perfectly on routes they both serve.2 
Airlines are not the only major industry in which the major firms reach 
coordinated outcomes in oligopoly markets (that is, markets in which a small 
number of firms are significant rivals), leading to higher prices and other 
harms to buyers.3 A recent empirical study found that the 2008 joint venture 
between Miller and Coors allowed the major brewers to coordinate to reduce 
competition between themselves, thereby increasing the price of beer by an 
 
1 In the early 1990s, the government found that when a rival reduced fares, an airline would 
commonly price match on that route and also on another route that was a more important route to 
the airline that cut fares (for example, a route with an end point at the discounter’s hub). Proposed 
Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Airline Tariff Publ’g Co., 59 
Fed. Reg. 15,225, 15,225 (Mar. 31, 1994); Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact 
Statement, United States v. Airline Tariff Publ’g Co., 58 Fed. Reg. 3,971, 3,971 (Jan. 12, 1993). The 
Justice Department more recently alleged that the airlines continue to employ such “cross-market 
initiatives” to deter discounting and prevent fare wars. See Amended Complaint at 16, United States 
v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-01236-CKK). 
Multimarket contact is not the only coordination mechanism that the airlines employ. See, e.g., 
Gaurab Aryal, Federico Ciliberto & Benjamin T. Leyden, Coordinated Capacity Reductions and Public 
Communication in the Airline Industry 2 (Becker Friedman Inst., Working Paper No. 2018-11, 2020) 
(finding evidence suggesting that legacy airlines use public communication in quarterly earnings 
calls to coordinate on capacity levels). 
2  Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit 
Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry, 45 RAND J. ECON. 764, 765, 789 
(2014) (analyzing data from 2007); see also William N. Evans & Ioannis N. Kessides, Living by the 
“Golden Rule”: Multimarket Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry, 109 Q.J. ECON. 341, 341-43 (1994) 
(finding a relationship between greater multimarket contact and higher airline fares using data from 
the mid-1980s). Enhanced coordination arising from a substantial increase in multimarket contact 
would be expected to raise airfares by two to five percent on routes where such contact is already at 
a moderate level. Ciliberto & Williams, supra, at 85-86. 
3 For other empirical examples, see infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. Our Article 
focuses on coordination among sellers and does not discuss coordination among buyers, although 
many of the issues are parallel. 
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estimated six to eight percent.4 They plausibly achieved the higher prices 
through leader-follower pricing.5 
One possible interpretation of the price increase is that the airlines and 
brewers engaged in explicit price-fixing or market division—collusive 
conduct that would violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act and would likely be 
criminally prosecuted by the Department of Justice if uncovered. That 
possibility would suggest that express cartels—those operating under explicit 
agreements—often go undetected and undeterred, consistent with what 
empirical studies have found. 6  Another interpretation of such evidence, 
which is also plausible and, we suspect, more likely, is that oligopoly conduct 
can often lead to coordinated outcomes that restrict competition without firms 
expressly colluding on an agreement that would violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.7 They might achieve those coordinated outcomes purposively, 
by identifying consensus terms of coordination and deterring cheating, or 
arrive at those outcomes simply as a consequence of recognizing their 
 
4 Nathan H. Miller & Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors 
Joint Venture, 85 ECONOMETRICA 1763, 1763 (2017). These price increases are over-and-above price 
changes that would have come about were the firms not coordinating, in the sense of how we use the 
term in this Article. 
5 See Nathan H. Miller, Gloria Sheu & Matthew C. Weinberg, Oligopolistic Price Leadership and 
Mergers: The United States Beer Industry 2-4 (June 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1494697/weinbergmillersheu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MTQ-UHNN] (showing that price leadership could lead to higher prices in this 
industry and referencing Justice Department pleadings describing the largest brewer as a price leader). 
6 Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Yanhao Wei, What Can the Duration of Discovered Cartels Tell Us 
About the Duration of All Cartels? 127 ECON. J. 1977, 1978 (2017) (finding that a cartel has a seventeen 
percent chance annually of either collapsing or being discovered); Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow 
Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 535 (1991) 
(concluding that the Justice Department detects at most thirteen to seventeen percent of cartels 
annually). By one back-of-the envelope calculation, nearly twenty-nine express cartels are active in 
the United States at any one time, overcharging U.S. buyers by $8.7 billion annually. JONATHAN B. 
BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 14 (2019). 
7 Coordinated outcomes that did not arise from express collusion can occasionally be addressed 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act by challenging practices facilitating coordination that have been 
adopted by agreement among rivals. E.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 336-38 
(1969) (finding that price verification on demand stabilized prices); see also id. at 339-40 (Fortas, J., 
concurring) (concluding that the information exchange limited price competition); cf. United States 
v. Gen. Elec. Co. and Westinghouse Elec. Co., No. 28228, 1977 WL 1474, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 
1977) (modifying consent decree to prevent firms previously convicted of price-fixing from adopting 
various practices); Proposed Modification of Existing Judgments, United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
42 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,004 (Mar. 30, 1977) (describing practices electrical equipment firms used to 
raise prices without express negotiation, including standardized product definitions, published price 
books, and buyer protection policies (such as meeting competition and most-favored-nation 
clauses)). One of us has argued that the Federal Trade Commission should use competition 
rulemaking to prohibit practices facilitating oligopoly coordination, including practices unilaterally 
adopted. See Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly 
Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 207-19 (1993). 
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interdependence and anticipating the natural and predictable reactions of 
their rivals to their price changes. 
Whether arrived at purposively or not, these examples of coordinated 
conduct suggest that the possibility of coordination among oligopolists is not 
effectively prevented by the prospect of Sherman Act liability.8 This theme 
contrasts with suggestions by antitrust commentators and courts influenced 
by the Chicago school: that oligopolies usually perform competitively absent 
express collusion, and that express collusion itself is difficult and therefore 
rare.9 As we describe below, the economics literature does not support those 
Chicago claims. 
In brief summary of economic concepts that we will explain more fully 
below,10 we define coordinated oligopoly outcomes as price elevation11 arising 
from strategic conduct. We say that a firm acts strategically when in setting 
prices, the firm takes into account how it expects that its rivals will respond–
as one would expect firms to do when those responses would be strong and 
likely to matter to buyers.12 In short, when high prices persist because firms 
are discouraged from cutting price by the anticipated responses of their rivals, 
we term the outcome coordinated.13 
We term the outcome coordinated regardless of how those anticipated 
responses arise.14 Our point is the breadth of this category, not the creation 
 
8 The most influential antitrust treatise of the mid-twentieth century took a similar view. CARL 
KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 110 
(1959) (suggesting that the joint exercise of market power, exercised without engaging in conduct 
violating the Sherman Act, characterizes “a considerable number” of markets). 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Section I.B. 
11 Alterations to nonprice terms of competition that harm buyers would be treated analogously. 
We focus on price for concreteness. 
12 When both anticipated rival responses (“conjectural variations” in economic language) and 
buyer reactions (“diversion ratios” in economic language) are substantial, these factors will 
substantially affect the firm’s gain or loss of customers in response to its cutting or raising its price 
and therefore its incentive to do so. For textbook discussions of the determination of equilibrium 
prices in oligopoly when firms have nonzero conjectural variations, see STEPHEN MARTIN, 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN CONTEXT 75 (2010); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, 
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 206-08 (3d ed. 1990). 
13 The noncoordinated benchmark for price is thus the price that would arise if firms behaved 
nonstrategically, that is, in a static Nash equilibrium when firms choose price or output, a widely 
used framework for antitrust and economic analysis. That framework is often in practice identified 
with “unilateral” oligopoly conduct, which in turn is commonly taken to be distinct from 
“coordinated” conduct. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES (2010) 20-27, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/ 
2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V2K-D3CN] [hereinafter 2010 HMG] (discussing 
unilateral and coordinated effects separately). 
14 Our definition is consistent with the way coordination is described in the horizontal merger 
guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines state: “Coordinated interaction involves conduct by multiple firms 
that is profitable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others.” Id. 
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of new dichotomies, but we nevertheless distinguish two types of responses. 
When firms act on the expectation that rivals will punish cheating on a 
common understanding in order to sustain and implement that 
understanding, we call the strategic conduct “purposive.”15 In other cases, the 
strategic conduct is “nonpurposive.” We use the latter term when firms 
respond to one another’s price changes in a natural and predictable business 
way, rather than as a part of a scheme or attempt to develop a consensus or 
deter price-cutting. As Donald Turner explained nearly six decades ago, a 
rational oligopolist understands that its rivals will “inevitably react” when it 
cuts prices “because otherwise the price cut will make a substantial inroad on 
their sales.” 16  That rivals will “inevitably react” can lead to coordinated 
outcomes even when firms do not seek to develop a common understanding 
or punish cheating. We view the distinction between purposive and 
nonpurposive conduct as suggestive and useful, but not as setting forth an 
 
at 24. Similarly, the 1992 Guidelines state: “Coordinated interaction is comprised of actions by a 
group of firms that are profitable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions 
of the others.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 17 (1992) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3XYF-6Y69] [hereinafter 1992 HMG]. 
15 We use the term “purposive” to convey an important distinction both among forms of 
conduct and among ways of analyzing conduct, but we do not mean to suggest all possible 
connotations of the term. We do not intend the term to be interpreted to incorporate all conduct 
undertaken in anticipation of likely responses. For instance, if (as in economists’ Stackelberg 
equilibrium) a price leader commits to its price and others set their prices to maximize their profits 
in reliance on that commitment, we would call the leader’s strategic conduct nonpurposive. But if 
the followers always match the leader’s price even when that is not their best response based on costs 
and demand, because they expect the leader to punish them if they do otherwise, we would call the 
leader’s conduct purposive. Purposive strategic conduct is closer to “negotiating” or “scheming” or 
“rewarding and punishing” than to naturally “reacting.” The distinction is also analogous to the 
distinction Thomas Schelling makes between a “warning” and a “threat.” Both are communications 
aimed at shaping the responses of others (which could be other nations, in international affairs). A 
warning describes what would already (absent the communication) be the actor’s true and inherent 
interest (akin to a natural and predictable, or nonpurposive, response), while a threat communicates 
a calculated commitment to a position not otherwise in the actor’s interest (akin to conduct that 
would be purposive if carried out). THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 123-
24 (1960). The term “purposive” may also mislead to the extent it suggests that the distinction turns 
on the subjective intent of the decisionmakers at the firms. Intent evidence may aid in understanding 
and interpreting conduct, however. See infra text accompanying notes 66–69 (providing hypothetical 
examples of documentary or testimonial evidence relevant to classifying strategic conduct as 
purposive or nonpurposive). 
16 Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism 
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 665 (1962). If, for example, Turner explains, “there are 
only three producers of equal size and a price cut by one doubles his sales, the sales of each of his 
two competitors will be cut in half.” Id. 
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analytically watertight classification scheme.17 Indeed, these two forms of 
strategic conduct can coexist,18 and there undoubtedly are gray areas. 
The previously referenced studies of airlines and brewing found that firms 
reached coordinated outcomes but did not seek to distinguish between 
purposive and nonpurposive conduct. Either type of strategic conduct could 
result in price leadership (brewing) or be facilitated by greater multimarket 
contact (airlines).19 It is nonetheless important for antitrust enforcement to 
be alert for risks both of purposive and of nonpurposive strategic conduct. 
Because so much recent antitrust discussion has focused on coordinated 
outcomes arising from purposive conduct, distinguishing between the two 
forms—even while recognizing that some strategic conduct is hard to 
classify—is helpful in drawing proper attention to nonpurposive 
coordination, and, relatedly, in understanding why antitrust commentators 
and courts influenced by the Chicago school wrongly dismiss the latter 
possibility. Distinguishing the two types of strategic conduct also facilitates 
a detailed economic analysis of the competitive effects of firm conduct, as we 
illustrate below with respect to evaluating the coordinated effects of 
horizontal mergers. 
As has long been recognized, the difficulty of attacking express cartels and 
the Sherman Act’s circumscribed coverage of other forms of coordination20 
gives horizontal merger enforcement an important prophylactic role: it 
increases the importance of preventing changes in market structure through 
 
17 To illustrate the distinctions our framework makes using categories and concepts taken from 
economic theory, suppose price is the decision variable. If the oligopolists adopt Bertrand-Nash responses 
(conjectures of zero) in a one-time interaction, the outcome is our noncoordination benchmark. If the 
firms have continuous and nonzero conjectures that are not history-dependent, and prices exceed 
benchmark levels, the outcome is coordinated and we would likely say achieved through nonpurposive 
strategic behavior. If the firms’ strategies are discontinuous and history-dependent, as with punishment 
responses, the outcome is coordinated and achieved through purposive conduct. In particular we would 
apply that label to express collusion (for example, an express agreement to raise price or allocate markets 
or customers), which often involves such punishment responses. 
18 See MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 41 (2006) (indicating 
that a factor that makes coordination easier is likely to do so both when firms talk and when they do not). 
More generally, purposive and nonpurposive coordinated conduct will coexist when an oligopoly 
supergame model leads to elevated prices while supposing that the oligopolists revert to an outcome 
consistent with some nonpurposive coordination (an outcome that falls short of joint profit-
maximization) in the event the coordinated outcome from purposive conduct falls apart. 
19 In discussing their results, though, the authors of these studies plausibly adopt purposive 
conduct interpretations. The authors of the brewing study take a modeling perspective that 
presumes purposive conduct. Miller, Sheu & Weinberg, supra note 5, at 2. The authors of the airlines 
study interpret increased multimarket conduct as loosening incentive compatibility constraints on 
coordinated outcomes, Ciliberto & Williams, supra note 2, at 764, and discuss some of their results 
in terms of incentives to deviate from a coordinated outcome. Id. at 769, 780. 
20  The Sherman Act has been interpreted to insulate many coordinated outcomes from 
antitrust liability. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(“Express collusion violates antitrust law; tacit collusion does not.”). 
2020] Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, & Horizontal Mergers 1991 
a horizontal merger that would make coordinated outcomes more likely or 
more effective.21 The Clayton Act focuses on whether a horizontal merger 
will harm competition, including by making coordination more likely or more 
effective, regardless of whether the coordination would independently violate 
the Sherman Act. For this reason, we look to merger enforcement when 
discussing the implications of our analysis for antitrust.22 
Although we explore a more detailed and nuanced economic analysis, one 
important conclusion is straightforward: whether through purposive or 
nonpurposive conduct, greater concentration can be expected to make 
coordination more likely, stronger, or more effective. Accordingly, our 
analysis supports a structural merger policy, by which mergers between rivals 
that increase concentration significantly in a concentrated market are 
presumed to harm competition. 
In Part I of our Article, we explain why coordinated conduct is a serious 
concern. We explain in Part II why we disagree with the Chicago views that 
such conduct is unlikely absent express collusion and that express collusion 
itself is uncommon. Part III explains how our analysis of coordination should 
apply to merger enforcement. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATED OLIGOPOLY CONDUCT 
Modern economics offers many reasons to think that coordinated 
outcomes may arise and persist in oligopoly markets. We begin with 
empirical, experimental, and real-world evidence, then review the relevant 
economic theory. 
 
21 See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 901(b)(2) (4th ed. 2016) (explaining that a 
“central objective of merger policy is to obstruct” the creation of “oligopolistic market structures in which 
tacit coordination can occur”); 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: 
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1432(d)(5) (3d ed. 2010) 
(describing the “containment” approach of addressing the oligopoly problem through prohibiting 
concentrating mergers and facilitating practices); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 
70 HASTINGS L.J. 45, 51-55 (2018) (justifying an incipiency test under the Clayton Act based on the 
threat of post-merger coordination that would not violate the Sherman Act); cf. Richard A. Posner, 
Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1566 (1969) (indicating that 
the “extraordinary stringency” of the merger guidelines that the Justice Department promulgated while 
Donald Turner was Assistant Attorney General “may reflect in part Turner’s earlier expressed view that 
once a market has become highly concentrated there is little that can be done under existing law to 
prevent noncompetitive, interdependent pricing”). 
22 Our view of coordination is also relevant to a number of other important antitrust issues we do 
not discuss, including identifying express collusion, inferring collusive agreements from circumstantial 
evidence, and analyzing the horizontal consequences of vertical mergers. For analyses of economic issues 
raised by express collusion and its prosecution, see generally JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., THE 
THEORY OF COLLUSION AND COMPETITION POLICY (2017); ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. 
MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS (2012). 
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A. Empirical, Experimental, and Real-World Evidence 
The relevant empirical literature extends beyond the previously discussed 
studies of airlines and brewing.23 Studies have found that through strategic 
conduct leading to coordinated outcomes, prices of cellular telephone services 
increased between seven and ten percent; and prices for hospital services offered 
by multi-hospital systems increased between six and seven percent.24 In one 
urban retail gasoline market, dominant firms engaged in price leadership to 
establish, after many years of trying, coordinated prices as high as fifteen percent 
above those that would otherwise have prevailed without coordination.25 
Empirical studies have also found that express cartels—one type of 
purposive coordination—are durable. According to one study, the average 
cartel lasted approximately eight years, even though many cartels in the 
sample were terminated by antitrust enforcement. 26  Some cartels have 
survived more than forty years.27 These results indicate that coordinated 
outcomes, once attained, can readily be sustained. 
Economists have identified a wide range of factors thought to facilitate 
coordination. One typical list includes: a small number of firms, simple or 
homogenous products, open and transparent transactions, excess capacity in 
the hands of rivals, predictable demand, small and frequent transactions, 
small buyers, inelastic market demand, low marginal costs relative to price, 
and high customer switching costs.28 The experimental economics literature 
 
23 See Christopher John Sullivan, The Ice Cream Split: Empirically Distinguishing Price and 
Product Space Collusion, in Three Essays on Product Collusion 36, 65 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Michigan), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/ 
138544/sullivcj_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/VA2P-TYKM] (finding that 
through coordination over prices and product offerings of super-premium ice cream, Ben & Jerry’s 
and Häagen-Dazs raised average prices by nine and eleven percent, respectively). 
24 Matt Schmitt, Multimarket Contact in the Hospital Industry, 10 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 
361, 363 (2018); Meghan R. Busse, Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular Telephone 
Industry, 9 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 287, 317 (2000). For both industries, the studies found 
that coordinated outcomes were facilitated by multimarket conduct, as was found with airlines. 
25 David P. Byrne & Nicolas de Roos, Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline, 109 
AM. ECON. REV. 591, 600 (2019). 
26 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of 
Cartel Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455, 463 (2011); see also Ari Hyytinen, Frode Steen & Otto 
Toivanen, Cartels Uncovered, 10 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 190, 210 (2018) (finding that 
legal cartels in Finland had an average expected duration of 8.5 years); Harrington & Wei, supra 
note 6, at 1998, 2002 (finding that cartels discovered by the Justice Department, and thus terminated 
by antitrust enforcement, had an average duration of 5.8 years; adjusted for a statistical bias, the 
estimated average duration is between 5.3 and 6.8 years). 
27 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 43, 53 tbl.2 (2006) (indicating that a number of cartels lasted at least forty years). 
28 ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, 
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION 
POLICY 298-306 (3d ed. 2017) (setting forth factors facilitating or frustrating coordination and 
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supports many of these predictions—and, in doing so, finds that coordinated 
outcomes are achieved and sustained in a range of laboratory settings, though 
they are missed or fall apart in others.29 
Experimental studies have found occasional coordinated outcomes in 
“prisoners’ dilemma” experiments when firms interact in a single period or 
for a fixed and certain number of periods. 30  These are settings where 
economic models suggest that rational actors would do otherwise. The 
behavioral economics literature suggests that concerns for fairness and a 
desire for vengeance may support coordination by inducing firms to punish 
cheating even when that would not be a rational response. 31  A recent 
experimental study lends some support. It finds that that coordination is 
more stable when firms target specific rivals for punishment rather than when 
they allow a coordinated consensus to break down, particularly when a large 
number of firms coordinate—that is to say, when the incentives of any 
 
explaining their rationales). While lists of factors facilitating coordination like these have typically 
been created with purposive strategic conduct and the problem of inferring an agreement among 
rivals from circumstantial evidence in mind, the same factors would often also plausibly make 
nonpurposive coordination more of a threat. 
29 See generally Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, Experimental Economics in Antitrust, 
in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 229, 230-37 (Roger 
D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014); Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, Oligopoly Experiments in the 
Current Millennium, 27 J. ECON. SURVEYS 439, 448-50 (2013); Charles A. Holt, Industrial 
Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 349, 398-416 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995). 
30 Holt, supra note 29, at 402. In a prisoner’s dilemma, a common, simple, and well-known way 
of modeling oligopoly interactions, all firms would profit if they can reach and sustain a coordinated 
outcome. But each firm would find it even more profitable to cheat on that outcome if they knew 
that their rivals would not respond. In a single-period interaction, or a repeated interaction over a 
known fixed period, standard theory would predict that the temptation to cheat prevents successful 
coordination. See id. at 399 (explaining how the prisoner’s dilemma game models the possibility of 
coordinated outcomes); see also William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful 
Minds and Mavericks (April 24, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11050.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X783-UND4] (same). 
31 Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics and Antitrust, in 1 THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 205, 212-13 (Roger D. Blair & D. 
Daniel Sokol eds., 2014) (noting that “vengeance induces more aggressive punishments for 
deviating”). For game theoretic work on the possibility of collusion when firms predictably evade 
following through on threatened punishments that harm the punisher, see Joseph Farrell & Eric 
Maskin, Renegotiation in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 327, 328 (1989) (noting that 
instead of punishing the violator in ways that would hurt other participants, “it seems plausible that 
[firms] will renegotiate back to mutual cooperation”), B. Douglas Bernheim & Debraj Ray, Collective 
Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 295, 296-97 (1989) (noting the 
possibility of firms renegotiating self-enforcing agreements), and Joseph Farrell, Renegotiation in 
Repeated Oligopoly Interaction, in INCENTIVES, ORGANIZATION, AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 303, 306 
(Peter J. Hammond & Gareth D. Myles eds., 2000) (noting that in less concentrated markets, “full 
collusion (or anything close to it) is inconsistent with what might seem a reasonable form of 
renegotiation-proofness”). 
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individual firm to punish would be weak absent concerns for fairness.32 In 
addition, behavioral economists have raised the possibility that firms would 
choose not to cheat on a coordinated consensus even when it would appear 
rational do so if the coordinating firms can foster a sense of loyalty or esprit 
de corps among themselves.33 
Real-world evidence similarly confirms the plausibility of coordinated 
oligopoly outcomes. Antitrust enforcers have found that express cartels with 
five or six (or even ten or more) members are not uncommon.34 Business 
schools routinely teach the adoption of practices that facilitate coordination 
without risking antitrust liability.35 
Coordination may not easily be recognized because coordinated outcomes in 
real-world markets, while harmful, do not necessarily approach the joint profit-
maximizing outcome that a monopolist would achieve. Empirical studies and 
the case law show that coordination can be incomplete or imperfect in many 
ways, and that coordinated outcomes may be accompanied by conduct that is 
competitive in some respects.36 This should not be surprising. Firms matching 
rivals’ price-cuts is, from one perspective, quintessentially competitive behavior. 
But when firms anticipate that their rivals will behave that way—either in a 
natural business way or as a response to cheating—that expected reaction, which 
may seem competitive, can make coordinated outcomes possible by discouraging 
price-cutting in the first instance. 
Even express cartels may not coordinate perfectly. The records of one 
express cartel, the early 20th-century Sugar Institute, indicated that it would 
allow occasional cheating to go unpunished.37 There are a number of other 
 
32 Catherine Roux & Christian Thöni, Collusion Among Many Firms: The Disciplinary Power of 
Targeted Punishment, 116 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 83, 91 (2015). A number of prior experimental 
studies varying the number of market participants had found that tacit collusion was often 
unsuccessful outside of duopoly. Id. at 83-84. 
33 Armstrong & Huck, supra note 31, at 214. 
34 Kolasky, supra note 30; Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel 
Success?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 59 tbl.4 (2006); see also John William Hatfield, Scott Duke 
Kominers & Richard Lowery, Collusion in Brokered Markets 3-4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 20-023, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3450767 [https://perma.cc/6PG3-JG35] (explaining 
high real estate commission rates in markets with large numbers of independent brokers in terms of 
a supergame model of oligopoly conduct). 
35 This has been common for at least four decades. Cf. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE 
STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 92-95 (1980) 
(encouraging firms to seek to improve all firms’ positions by employing active market signaling 
through announcements, selective advertising to discipline recalcitrant rivals, and price leadership); 
id. at 106 (advocating standardization to simplify industry prices and other decision variables so that 
oligopolists can establish an advantageous focal point for their industry). 
36 See infra notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
37 David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence 
from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 379, 393 (2001) (noting that, although “wholesale 
cheating” was punished, “some cheating” was not, and collusion was “(imperfectly) sustained”). 
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examples of successful price-fixing or bid-rigging with some cheating. 38 
Moreover, some cartels collude on some but not all competitive dimensions. 
British Airways and its co-conspirators colluded to set passenger fuel charges on 
air travel between the United States and the United Kingdom but not on the 
base air fare.39 Sotheby’s and its auction house co-conspirators colluded to set 
the commission charged to sellers but not the commissions charged to buyers.40 
Imperfect coordination can also exist outside of express cartels. 
Coordinated prices probably fell short of monopoly levels in the brewing, 
airlines, cellular telephone, hospital, and urban gasoline industry examples 
that were the subject of empirical studies we previously discussed. 41 
Empirical studies have also identified markets such as the 19th-century 
railroad industry in which coordinated outcomes in some periods were 
punctuated by occasional price wars in others42 as well as markets in which 
coordination took place on some but not all competitive dimensions.43 
 
38 B. Douglas Bernheim & Erik Madsen, Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels, 
107 AM. ECON. REV. 387, 390-93 (2017) (describing cheating in various cartels, including a lysine 
cartel, a food flavor-enhancing nucleotide cartel, a citric acid producers’ cartel, the Sugar Institute 
cartel, and the OPEC cartel). 
39 The airlines also colluded to set cargo shipment rates on the same routes. Plea Agreement at 3–
6, United States v. British Airways PLC, No. 07-183 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2007) (describing British Airways’s 
admission of guilt as to fixing the cargo rate as well as well as the passenger fuel surcharge). 
40 Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Sotheby’s Holdings Inc., No. 00-1081, 2000 WL 
35630180 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2000). 
41 In general, one would expect imperfect coordination to be more likely when oligopolists 
coordinate by identifying a focal outcome, as through price leadership, rather than by explicitly 
communicating. Explicitly discussing terms of coordination would likely better reach the joint 
profit-maximizing outcome, but would also risk antitrust enforcement under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. See Baker, supra note 7, at 165 n.43 (“[T]he feasible set of coordinated equilibria . . . 
that are consistent with a plausible focal rule. . . . need not contain the joint profit-maximizing 
equilibrium.”); MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 22, at 16 (arguing that coordination without explicit 
communication tends to allow “[d]eviations induced by self-interest profit maximization [to] creep 
into [firms’] conduct, and joint profits will fall short of monopoly levels”). 
42 See generally Glenn Ellison, Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee, 25 
RAND J. ECON. 37 (1994) (studying the Joint Executive Committee, an 1880s railroad cartel); 
Robert H. Porter, On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 415 (1985) (same); 
Robert H. Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886, 14 BELL J. 
ECON. 301 (1983) (same). This phenomenon has also been observed in other industries. See, e.g., 
Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty: The U.S. Steel Industry, 1933-1939, 32 
J.L. & ECON. S47, S67, S71 (1989) (finding that occasional price wars in response to unexpected 
declines in demand (that is, marketplace punishments) supported coordination in the steel industry 
during the late 1930s); Timothy F. Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile 
Industry: The 1955 Price War, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 457, 471-72 (1987) (finding evidence suggesting that 
auto makers’ coordinated behavior was briefly interrupted by competitive behavior before returning 
to coordination). 
43  Frode Steen & Lars Sørgard, Disadvantageous Semicollusion: Price Competition in the 
Norwegian Airline Industry (NHH Dept. of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 27 2012, 2012), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2205825 [https://perma.cc/B363-4DSL]. 
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B. Economic Theory 
Economic theory looks at coordinated outcomes resulting from strategic 
conduct in two general ways. In one perspective, oligopolists are seen as 
collectively working towards a market outcome (for instance, a price level and 
an allocation of market shares), constrained by the need to design or at least 
identify intended responses to cheating on that outcome that are both credible 
and sufficiently punitive to minimize the cheating concern.44 Oligopolists are 
usually viewed as focusing on sustainable (self-enforcing) market outcomes that 
maximize profits, though that focus is not essential to this perspective. 
In the other perspective, oligopolists’ natural and predictable business 
responses to one another’s price changes are the starting point, and a 
coordinated outcome emerges organically from the interplay of those 
responses.45 Substantial coordination can arise in such a framework, but there 
is no expectation that the coordinated outcome would maximize anything. 
When coordinated outcomes arise from purposive conduct, oligopolists 
consciously or purposively put in place responses that discourage price-
cutting because they collectively want the resulting high prices and are trying 
to make them stick. This path to coordination involves some activity aimed 
at reaching consensus on terms of coordination and enforcing that 
consensus.46 This may involve determining the prices the firms will each 
charge, the output they will each produce, or the customers they will each 
serve. It may also involve clarifying how they will define, diagnose and punish 
cheating. Simple economic models often assume that cheating on the 
consensus by price-cutting will be punished by vigorous retaliatory price cuts, 
though other punishment strategies are also possible.47 We will occasionally 
 
44 In technical language, economists taking this perspective model coordination as a choice of 
a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a repeated game. Often the focus is on outcomes that maximize 
profits (or something else) among the subgame-perfect equilibria. For recent examples of economic 
discussions of antitrust policy that view coordination through this lens, see generally Robert H. 
Porter, Mergers and Coordinated Effects, INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with 
authors); Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright & Jean Tirole, The Economics of 
Tacit Collusion: Final Report for DG Competition, European Commission (IDEI, Working Paper No. 186, 
2003), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion 
_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/RBC6-LMHQ]. 
45 In technical terms, this approach calls on the ideas of conjectural variations. 
46 Successful coordination also requires that the outcome not be entirely undermined by the 
entry of new competitors or expansion by noncoordinating rivals. E.g., Levenstein & Suslow, supra 
note 27, at 44 (noting that coordination is threatened by “entry (or expansion) by non[-coordinating] 
firms”). We assume throughout that coordinating firms are free from new competition or can deter 
it, at least to a degree that makes coordination among them profitable and of concern. 
47 When the major airlines went beyond matching rival fare cuts to reduce fares on routes 
important to the rivals, see supra text accompanying note 1 (discussing conduct by airlines subject to 
Justice Department enforcement separately in the 1990s and the 2010s), they were plausibly engaging 
in purposive conduct. 
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use the term “purposive coordination” as shorthand for coordinated outcomes 
arising from purposive conduct. 
A prominent, though simplified, theoretical model of purposive oligopoly 
conduct finds that even hundreds of rival firms interacting repeatedly can 
sustain monopoly prices without creating net incentives to cheat. 48 
Coordinated outcomes often remain feasible even after adding to the model 
complications like differences across firms in costs and product features, 
uncertainty about demand, and slowed or limited punishment responses to 
rival cheating.49 The theoretical literature also recognizes that coordinated 
conduct could be limited to some but not all competitive dimensions.50 
Purposive coordination includes, but is broader than, expressly collusive 
conduct such as price-fixing and market division. Much discussion of “tacit 
collusion” in antitrust commentary explores how firms might purposively find 
their way toward a consensus plan and enforce it through price reactions without 
necessarily engaging in conduct that would violate the Sherman Act. 51  By 
defining “coordinated” outcomes in economic terms, we include, but do not limit 
the concept to, outcomes that result from “collusion”: a legal term that usually 
carries the idea of an agreement,52 which is a predicate for liability under Section 
1 of the Sherman Act.53 Even when strategic conduct is purposive, if consensus 
high prices are reached through leader-follower pricing conduct, that outcome 
 
48  Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 329, 365–66 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989). 
49 See, e.g., Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price 
Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 89-94 (1984) (identifying the feasibility of coordination in 
markets with uncertainty about demand). 
50 See, e.g., Frode Steen & Lars Sørgard, Semicollusion, 5 FOUND. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 
153, 165–66 (2009) (describing the theory of coordination on one choice variable, a dimension of rivalry, 
while competing on others); David T. Levy & James D. Reitzes, Basing-Point Pricing and Incomplete 
Collusion, 33 J. REGIONAL SCI. 27, 29-33 (1993) (same); Chaim Fershtman & Neil Gandal, 
Disadvantageous Semicollusion, 12 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 141, 152 (1994) (same). 
51 Since the mid-1970s, under the influence of the Chicago approach to antitrust, the term 
“tacit collusion” has come to mean no more than an agreement proved through circumstantial 
evidence. Baker, supra note 7, at 145. As a matter of logic, however, an express agreement (in which 
the parties provide each other with explicit assurances, usually verbal, that they will carry out their 
promises) proved through circumstantial evidence is not the same as a tacit understanding (in which 
no such assurances are given). Id. at 145 n.7. 
52 Id. at 152 n.16. In our framework, express collusion can be understood as purposive strategic 
behavior in which equilibrium selection involves conscious and explicit scheming, most likely 
through talking. An “agreement” can be understood as a coordinated outcome reached through what 
one of us has termed the “forbidden process” of negotiation and exchange of assurances, rather than 
through the sort of leader-follower behavior that firms cannot be expected to avoid and that courts 
cannot be expected to remedy. Id. at 179, 191. 
53  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). We follow the common practice of summarizing the “contract, 
combination[,] . . . or conspiracy” language of the statute through the term “agreement.” Id. 
1998 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1985 
would probably not be deemed to have resulted from an “agreement.” 54 
Coordinated outcomes arising from nonpurposive strategic conduct are even 
less likely to satisfy the agreement requirement of Section 1. 
When oligopolists respond to one another’s price changes in a natural 
business way, they are engaged in nonpurposive strategic conduct. Although 
those reactions are not part of an express scheme or an informal effort to develop 
a common understanding or deter price-cutting, those predictable responses will 
generally affect oligopolists’ incentives and may well discourage price-cutting. 
As the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines note, coordination “includes 
situations in which each rival’s response to competitive moves made by others is 
individually rational and not motivated by retaliation or deterrence nor intended 
to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless emboldens price 
increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce prices or offer customers 
better terms.”55  We call this type of strategic conduct “nonpurposive” (and 
occasionally refer to coordinated outcomes arising from such conduct as 
“nonpurposive coordination”). As was recognized by Donald Turner in the mid-
twentieth century, 56  nonpurposive coordination is likely to be common in 
oligopoly and difficult to prohibit—difficult even for intelligent oligopolists to 
avoid and difficult for judges to remedy. 
To motivate our view that coordination from nonpurposive conduct is 
common, we begin by observing that oligopolists typically monitor and 
respond to rivals’ price changes.57 When one firm cuts its price and another 
responds naturally, as we put it above, we have in mind that the second firm 
is responding in a predictable way to an objective change in its business 
environment. The second firm might naturally respond by cutting price, for 
example, if it expects the first firm’s new price to persist, if the second firm 
loses some of what it had been thinking of as reliable customers, or if it learns 
from observing the price reduction that the first firm has lower costs or a 
different business strategy than it had believed. These responses need not be 
part of an effort to enforce a consensus on terms of coordination; they are just 
what firms naturally and predictably do. Not surprisingly, the economics 
 
54  Richard Posner and Donald Turner famously debated whether “conscious parallelism,” 
including leader-follower conduct, should be deemed an “agreement” under the Sherman Act. See 
GAVIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 320-24 (surveying the Turner-Posner debate). Turner’s position—
that it would be impractical for courts to interpret the Sherman Act to reach such conduct, even 
when the economic consequences mirrored those of express collusion, because the conduct is 
unavoidable and courts cannot be expected to devise viable remedies that avoid chilling beneficial 
conduct—has largely prevailed. Id. at 322. 
55 2010 HMG, supra note 13, at 24-25. 
56 See supra notes 16 & 54 and accompanying text. 
57 Such conduct is a common source of evidence in market definition, where it is a basis for 
inferring what firms think about buyer substitution patterns. Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: 
An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 141 (2007). 
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literature has long recognized that objective sources of oligopoly dynamics 
such as these can lead to coordinated outcomes.58 
Prominent theoretical models of nonpurposive oligopoly conduct suggest 
the plausibility of coordinated outcomes. In one, firms match rivals’ 
competitive decisions before customers react (so-called “quick responses”).59 
Edward Chamberlin’s simplified and informal quick response model, in which 
he pointed out that oligopolists could have strong incentives to charge the 
monopoly price,60 was influential in shaping the skepticism about oligopoly 
that commonly characterized courts and commentators during antitrust’s 
structural era, which dated from the 1940s through the late 1970s.61 
In another prominent model of nonpurposive oligopoly conduct,62 each 
firm chooses its price based on (reacting to) the price that its rival most 
recently chose and that will briefly persist, but does not otherwise consider 
how the firm’s rival behaved in the past.63 In this model, Eric Maskin and 
 
58 See, e.g., Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity 
Competition with Large Fixed Costs, 56 ECONOMETRICA 549, 553 (1988); Edward H. Chamberlin, 
Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are Few, 44 Q.J. ECON. 63, 65, 88 (1929). The economics literature has 
similarly identified oligopoly dynamics arising from objective sources in other contexts. See generally 
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs, 19 RAND J. ECON. 123 
(1988) (identifying switching costs as the objective source); Alan Beggs & Paul Klemperer, Multi-
Period Competition with Switching Costs, 60 ECONOMETRICA 651 (1992) (same); Michael L. Katz & 
Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 55 (1992) 
(identifying network effects as the objective source). 
59 Quick rival responses are plausibly understood as nonpurposive reactions to the immediate 
competitive environment, although they could also arise from purposive conduct. See generally 
Robert M. Anderson, Quick-Response Equilibrium (Oct. 26, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors); V. Bhaskar, Quick Responses in Duopoly Ensure Monopoly Pricing, 29 ECON. 
LETTERS 103 (1989). 
60 Chamberlin, supra note 58, at 86, 89. See generally EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE 
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 48 (8th ed. 1962) (describing the tendency to charge 
the monopoly price). 
61 During that period, the courts and antitrust enforcers were even hostile to small horizontal 
mergers in markets that would be considered unconcentrated by today’s standards. See, e.g., United 
States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines 
(1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,101 (showing antitrust enforcers’ hostility to 
horizontal mergers between firms with low shares in less concentrated markets). 
62 See Maskin & Tirole, supra note 58. In the model, the timing of adjustment costs creates short 
term commitments, which affect rival reactions. See Engelbert J. Dockner, A Dynamic Theory of 
Conjectural Variations, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 377 (1992) (exploring the relationship between dynamic 
oligopolistic competition and static conjectural variations equilibria in a model with adjustment costs); 
Luis M.B. Cabral, Conjectural Variations as a Reduced Form, 49 ECON. LETTERS 397, 397-98 (1995) 
(identifying a dynamic game where the conjectural variation solution is an exact reduced form); cf. Zach 
Y. Brown & Alexander MacKay, Competition in Pricing Algorithms 3-5 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 20-067, 2020) (finding that when firms compete by adopting simple pricing algorithms that are linear 
in rivals’ prices, thus making short-run commitments, conjectural variation equilibria can arise with 
prices that exceed those arising in static Nash equilibria when firms choose price). 
63 These firms employ “Markov strategies”: they base their decisions on the current state of the 
world only. Bygones are bygones: decisions do not depend on what rivals did in the past, except insofar 
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Jean Tirole find that oligopolists will sustain high prices when each firm 
correctly expects that if it cuts its price, its rival will cut price too. That 
expectation dilutes the benefit from such discounting.64 Maskin and Tirole 
analyze these simple price-cutting reactions as natural responses in the 
competitive environment (hence nonpurposive conduct), as distinct from 
efforts to deter, reward, or punish rivals (which would be purposive conduct). 
In their analysis, “cutting one’s own price in response to another firm’s price 
cut is not carrying out a threat at all. It is merely an act of self-defense, an 
attempt to regain lost customers.” Put by Maskin and Tirole in another way, 
“the reaction is a response only to the other firm’s price cut and not to earlier 
history or to one’s own past prices.”65 
To help clarify the distinction between purposive and nonpurposive 
oligopoly conduct, suppose we have access to documents, emails, and 
testimony from the firms in an oligopoly. If the evidence shows that 
executives consider how rivals would respond when choosing key decision 
variables like prices and output, that suggests that firm conduct is strategic 
without distinguishing between purposive and nonpurposive conduct. 
Suppose, further, that we can query the executives at one firm candidly about 
what they think rivals would do were their firm to, for example, lower price, 
and learn that they expect rivals to lower prices in response. If that 
expectation discourages the first firm from cutting price in the first place, 
keeping prices high, the outcome is coordinated. 
Whether we would characterize the strategic conduct as purposive or 
nonpurposive depends in part on its rationale. 66  If, for example, the 
 
as those past actions objectively affect the current competitive environment. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole 
have explained that “Markov strategies seem at times to accord better with the customary conception of 
a reaction in the informal industrial organization literature than do, say, the reactions emphasized in the 
repeated game (or ‘supergame’) tradition.” Maskin & Tirole, supra note 58, at 553. 
64 The firms do not necessarily expect their rivals also to match if they raise price. Such 
asymmetric reactions are sometimes termed “kinked demand” strategies, although though firm-
specific demand curves in the models are not necessarily kinked: more elastic with respect to price 
increases than with respect to price declines. 
65 Maskin & Tirole, supra note 58, at 553. Maskin and Tirole also show that in a continuous 
model this behavior is a limiting case of the outcome of finite-horizon versions of their game, which 
we can interpret as showing that the behavior is essentially the result of recursion from Stackelberg-
type nonstrategic responses. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III: Cournot 
Competition, 31 EUR. ECON. REV. 947, 958 (1987). Zach Brown and Alexander MacKay developed 
another model of nonpurposive coordination. They suppose that firms compete by selecting simple 
pricing algorithms that are linear in rivals’ prices and that those choices of algorithms are themselves 
made nonstrategically. The “resulting game resembles competition with conjectural variations” and 
leads to coordinated outcomes, with prices that exceed those generated in static Nash-Bertrand 
models. Brown & MacKay, supra note 62, at 3 n.5. 
66 See supra notes 15 and 17 (describing features of strategic conduct that may suggest it is 
purposive). Some forms of conduct may be hard to classify, however. See, e.g., supra note 15 
(providing an example in which price-leadership could be purposive or nonpurposive). 
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executives, still speaking candidly, expect rivals to match simply because they 
would lose too many customers if they kept their price high, then the strategic 
conduct may be nonpurposive. If instead, for example, they expect rivals to 
match because the rivals think that doing so will make price-cutting less 
profitable for the first firm, then the strategic conduct may be purposive.67 
Or we might ask a firm’s executives why their own firm matches when 
rival firms cut prices. If the executives say, for example, “we need to maintain 
our policy of always matching rivals’ prices (regardless of whether it would 
seem to make business sense)”68 or “we want to send a signal that we would 
like to avoid a price war,” the strategic conduct may be purposive.69 However, 
if they say, “we see that the overall industry price level has declined, and will 
lose many customers unless we reduce price in response” or “we see that our 
rivals have reduced their excess production capacity, making it likely that they 
will not expand output much when we reduce our output,” the strategic 
conduct may be nonpurposive. 
As previously mentioned, purposive and nonpurposive conduct may 
coexist. Therefore, identifying one type of strategic conduct does not 
preclude the possibility that the oligopolists are also engaged in the other. If 
conduct is strategic, whether purposive or nonpurposive, and, in addition, 
prices exceed a coordination-free benchmark level, we would describe the 
outcome as coordinated. 
C. Summary 
Empirical studies, experimental results, real-world examples, and 
economic theory consistently indicates that oligopolies can sustain 
coordinated outcomes that restrict competition and yield higher prices and 
other harms to buyers. While coordination is not ubiquitous in oligopoly 
markets, it often arises, it does not require express collusion, and it need not 
be perfect (joint profit-maximizing). Oligopolistic coordination—whether 
joint profit-maximizing or, more likely, imperfect or incomplete relative to 
 
67 In terms of Thomas Schelling’s distinction, described supra note 15, communication of the 
first expectation (nonpurposive conduct) would be a warning while communication of the second 
(purposive conduct) would be a threat, at least if the rivals interpreted the intention to match as a 
credible commitment. 
68 Similarly, if the firm had made a contractual or public commitment to match its rivals’ prices, 
that may suggest its price-matching conduct is purposive. 
69 If a firm systematically responds to the loss of a customer to a specific rival by offering low 
prices to the rival’s largest customer (but not offering discounts to other prospective customers), 
that behavior too might suggest that strategic conduct is purposive, as it appears not to make 
business sense other than through disciplining the rival’s conduct. See supra notes 15 and 17 
(describing features of strategic conduct that may suggest it is purposive). 
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monopoly outcomes—is a serious problem and thus an appropriate concern 
of antitrust enforcement. 
II. THE DUBIOUS ARGUMENT FOR SKEPTICISM ABOUT OLIGOPOLY 
COORDINATION 
In contrast to the above, an influential strand of antitrust thinking 
associated with the Chicago school of antitrust views oligopolies benignly. 
According to Robert Bork, “[o]ligopolistic structures probably do not lead to 
significant restrictions of output,”70 and “non-collusive oligopolistic behavior, 
to the extent that it exists at all (and I am not persuaded that such behavior 
occurs outside of economics textbooks), rarely results in any significant ability 
to restrict output.”71 To similar effect, Richard Posner argued that cartels are 
“usually quite unstable” 72  and that outside of the most concentrated 
oligopolies, the “immense practical difficulties” oligopolists face in reaching 
cartel prices and the problem of maintaining a cartel “in the face of the 
inevitable self-destructive tendencies” cannot be solved without “the kind of 
elaborate apparatus of communication and enforcement that is bound to be 
detected eventually.”73 
According to such Chicagoans, antitrust should have little concern with 
oligopoly, outside of prosecuting express agreements to fix prices or divide 
markets or challenging mergers to near-monopoly, because oligopolies usually 
perform competitively absent express collusion and express collusion is 
difficult. This argument relies on three claims, each highly questionable. 
The first claim is that absent coordination, oligopolies perform 
competitively. Even if “coordination” were interpreted broadly, as we do (but 
the Chicagoans may not), this claim ignores the modern economic learning 
and antitrust experience with unilateral effects: even absent coordination,74 
 
70 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 196 (1978). 
71 Id. at 221. Consistent with this analysis, Bork also contended that horizontal mergers in 
oligopoly markets are unlikely to be harmful unless the merger is to monopoly or near monopoly. 
Id. Bork used the term “collusive” to refer to express naked horizontal cartels (price-fixing or market 
division), id. at 263-79, not to refer to the broader concept of coordination we employ. 
72 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 53 (1st ed. 1976). 
73 Id. at 54. As does Bork, Posner supposes that oligopolies either compete or collude (either 
expressly or tacitly). Id. at 40, 47. In the second edition of his book, Posner revised his exposition but 
continued to question whether oligopolies would succeed in avoiding competition, particularly in 
markets with more than a few sellers. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 68-69 (2d ed. 2001). 
74 We are referring to static Nash equilibrium when firms choose price or output. When 
oligopolists are behaving nonstrategically, their prices could be elevated above their costs. We treat 
such prices as our noncoordination benchmark, not as the outcome of coordinated conduct. 
2020] Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, & Horizontal Mergers 2003 
oligopoly performance is generally imperfect and can often become 
substantially worse with horizontal mergers well short of a monopoly.75 
The Chicagoans’ second claim is that coordinated outcomes from 
nonpurposive strategic conduct can simply be ignored.76 When Donald Turner 
described oligopoly outcomes, he had nonpurposive conduct in mind.77 Yet 
Richard Posner, criticizing Turner’s views from a Chicago perspective, appears 
to take as given that Turner is describing purposive conduct.78 This claim is 
the likely basis for the Chicagoan understanding of “tacit collusion” as express 
collusion demonstrated by circumstantial evidence.79 
The third claim is that purposive strategic conduct, including illegal 
collusion, is difficult, risky, and unstable—and therefore rare. Proponents of 
this view reference genuine challenges in achieving coordinated outcomes 
through purposive strategic conduct but overstate how difficult those 
challenges are to surmount. 
The challenges may include overcoming possible differences in incentives 
among oligopolists, short-run incentives to cheat on the coordinated 
outcome, difficulties in diagnosing which firm (if any) has done so, and 
incentives to shy away from imposing costly punishments. These and similar 
factors can indeed limit how widespread and effective purposive coordination 
is. But, modern theoretical literature analyzes these challenges and finds that 
coordinated outcomes from purposive conduct can often be achieved and 
sustained, 80  and empirical, real-world, and experimental evidence 
demonstrates that coordination is often feasible and durable. 81  Modern 
 
75  The theoretical economic literature that analyzes the Nash equilibria of static models 
prominently highlights the Bertrand paradox, by which even as few as two firms will reach an 
equilibrium where price is equal to cost. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 209-11 (1988) (discussing the Bertrand paradox). This outcome is the Nash 
equilibrium of a static oligopoly model in which homogeneous firms have identical and constant 
unit costs, and price is the decision variable. The Bertrand paradox is called a paradox “because it is 
hard to believe that firms in industries with few firms never succeed in manipulating the market 
price to make profits.” Id. at 210-11. The theoretical literature analyzing the Nash equilibria of static 
models also prominently discusses the Cournot model and the Bertrand model with product 
differentiation—each of which shows how static oligopoly interaction can elevate price above cost 
when a small change in a firm’s decision variable in the direction of increased competition would 
not divert all sales to that firm. 
76 See Posner, supra note 21, at 1569 (indicating Posner’s “doubts that the interdependence 
theory of oligopoly provides an adequate explanation as to why prices in oligopolistic industries 
should exceed competitive levels”). 
77 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
78 See Posner, supra note 21, at 1566-69 (arguing that Turner does not adequately account for 
oligopolists’ incentives to undermine coordination through cheating). Posner acknowledges a 
collaboration with Aaron Director and a great debt to George Stigler, both of whom, like Posner, 
are associated with the Chicago school. Id. at 1562 n.*. 
79 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
80 See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
81 See supra Section I.A. 
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economics thus accepts that a broad range of outcomes are possible in 
oligopoly markets—prominently including coordinated outcomes. 
Overstated obstacles to coordination arising from purposive conduct 
include the following: 
(1) Explicit communication (talking) is vulnerable to detection and prosecution 
by antitrust enforcers.82 Talking may indeed make coordination easier, but it is 
not always detectable by enforcers and not always necessary for oligopolists 
to reach coordinated outcomes through purposive conduct. Consensus terms 
of coordination can be reached without communication when there are other 
ways to make an outcome focal, as through leader-follower conduct or market 
allocation based, for example, on historical patterns. 
(2) Oligopolists’ divergent interests make it hard for them to reach consensus 
terms, especially without talking. Divergent interests can indeed pose a challenge 
for oligopolists seeking to reach terms of coordination, especially when the 
number of firms rises and firms compete on multiple dimensions.83 But there 
is no reason to think that this challenge is routinely or reliably prohibitive. 
For example, oligopolists can simplify coordination tasks, as by standardizing 
product dimensions or grandfathering in prior price differentials; or, they 
may instead attempt to minimize competition through means such as market 
division or reciprocal royalties rather than price-fixing.84 
(3) Successful coordination may require oligopolists to reach consensus on the 
terms and enforcement of planned punishment strategies, as well as reach consensus on 
the intended high prices and individual firm outputs. If oligopolists adopted the 
complex “optimal punishment schemes” identified in the theoretical economics 
literature, they would indeed often need to engage in such negotiations. But 
coordination can often be sustained with simple threats or punishment 
schemes, including simply jeopardizing the profitable coordination, that can be 
identified without detailed (or perhaps any) communication.85 
 
82 See supra note 41. 
83 GAVIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 296-97. 
84 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
85 The early experimental literature on cooperation in repeated prisoners’ dilemmas found that 
strategies that combined being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear had particular success in eliciting 
long-term cooperation. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 54 (1984). The 
most notable example was the simple “TIT FOR TAT” algorithm, which cooperates on the first 
move and practices reciprocity for both cooperation and defection thereafter. Id. at 118; cf. WILLIAM 
POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 106-18 (1992) (describing an early experiment in which two 
economists playing a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game induced trust and achieved some 
cooperation). Moreover, the early game theoretic literature on collusion found that fear of reversion 
to static Nash behavior—a natural result of a coordinated consensus breaking down—is often 
sufficient to deter cheating. Indeed, antitrust practitioners often center their analyses on that 
possibility rather than on more sophisticated punishment schemes. Joseph Harrington has observed 
that “cartels occur most frequently in markets for which buyers’ decisions are heavily based on price.” 
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
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(4) Even after reaching consensus, firms are likely to cheat on it, especially when 
firms can find ways to do so that delay or avoid detection. Proponents of this view 
rely on George Stigler’s observation that even firms with few rivals could have 
strong incentives to undercut collusive prices, leading to competitive 
outcomes.86 Short-term incentives to cheat on the consensus do indeed create a 
constraint or challenge for collusion, but this challenge can be overcome—as is 
evident from the prevalence and durability of cartels, the theoretical economic 
literature showing that collusion can persist even with dozens or hundreds of 
rivals and even with severe difficulties in identifying defection and defectors, 
and the theoretical and empirical studies showing how firms can achieve 
coordinated outcomes through purposive conduct in the face of uncertainty 
about rival behavior or difficulty monitoring that behavior on all competitive 
dimensions.87 Firms may also be able to improve detection and responses to 
cheating through openly adopted practices like product standardization, posting 
prices, or contractual commitments to match rivals’ prices.88 
Despite its reliance on these questionable premises, the Chicagoan benign 
view of oligopolies has circumscribed the range of antitrust enforcement. It 
has led the enforcement agencies (whether based on their own judgment or 
on their expectations of courts’ beliefs) to relax (i.e., increase over time) the 
concentration threshold above which horizontal mergers would be closely 
scrutinized and/or likely challenged.89 
 
Thoughts on Why Certain Markets Are More Susceptible to Collusion and Some Policy Suggestions for 
Dealing With Them, at 6, OECD doc. DAF/COMP/GF(2015)8 (Oct. 19, 2015), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF(2015)8
&docLanguage=En [https://perma.cc/TUS5-76FH]. If static Nash behavior in such markets is very 
competitive, as simple oligopoly models with prices as decision variables suggest, then reversion to 
static Nash behavior could support substantial price elevation in a supergame model, because in 
those models the degree of cooperation is limited by the strength of the incentive to avoid breakdown 
of cooperation. By contrast, the complex “optimal punishment schemes” that game theorists have 
analyzed would likely require communication to implement. On the design of optimal punishment 
schemes, see generally Dilip Abreu, On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting, 56 
ECONOMETRICA 383 (1988). 
86 See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964) (highlighting 
oligopolists’ incentive to cheat on a collusive outcome through secret price-cutting, while recognizing 
that under some circumstances, coordination could succeed). Richard Posner explicitly acknowledged 
the influence of Stigler’s model on his views. POSNER, supra note 72, at 47. 
87 See supra notes 37–43, 49–50 and accompanying text. 
88 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. To similar effect, when distributors or buyers of 
intermediate goods from multiple sources tell suppliers about discounts received from rival 
suppliers—which is often a natural negotiating tactic—they can facilitate (purposive) supplier 
coordination by speeding the detection and response to cheating. More generally, firms can deter 
cheating, thereby facilitating coordination, by increasing the transparency of what otherwise might 
be secret transactions. 
89 The threshold above which acquisitions would be scrutinized strictly “involved a reduction 
of the number of significant competitors in the following manner: 1960s (12 to 11), 1970s (9 to 8), 
1980s (6 to 5), 1990s (4 to 3), 2000s (4 to 3).” William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition 
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The Chicago perspective also led the Supreme Court in Brooke Group to 
take the view that oligopoly coordination is hard to achieve and unstable.90 
The Court explained, seeming to focus on purposive but not explicit 
coordination, that the “anticompetitive minuet” of raising prices through 
signaling “is most difficult to compose and to perform, even for a disciplined 
oligopoly” because signals “are a blunt and imprecise means of ensuring 
smooth cooperation, especially in the context of changing or unprecedented 
market circumstances.”91 In addition, according to the Court, there is a “high 
likelihood that any attempt to discipline will produce an outbreak of 
competition.”92 Moreover, the details of the Supreme Court’s explanation of 
why the industry was not congenial to coordination “has a distinctly Chicago 
flavor” not informed by insights from modern oligopoly theory.93  While 
modern courts accept the possibility of oligopolistic coordination, and are 
willing to find competitive harm from conduct in highly concentrated 
markets,94 they may nevertheless be led by Brooke Group to interpret the 
 
Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129, 143 (2009). 
Data released by the Federal Trade Commission about the disposition of horizontal merger 
investigations subject to “second requests” between 1996 and 2011 suggest that the likelihood of a 
challenge rises as (the Commission’s view of) the number of significant rivals falls, and that a 
challenge becomes more likely than not when the acquisition reduces the number of significant rivals 
from 5 to 4. FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER INVESTIGATION DATA: FISCAL 
YEARS 1996–2011 12 tbl.4.1 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-2011/130104horizontalmergerreport. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/JL5U-N2HN]. The likelihood of FTC enforcement when concentration is 
below this threshold has declined over time. JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND 
REMEDIES 24-33 (2015). The Justice Department likely behaves similarly to the FTC, but the 
former has not released comparable data. 
90 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227-28, 240 (1993). 
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court was wrong to suppose that the plaintiff “had the 
burden of proving either the actuality of supracompetitive pricing, or the actuality of tacit collusion.” 
Id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 227-28. The Court distinguished this conduct from “express coordination.” Id. at 227. 
Justice Stevens responded by taking a broader view of coordination, more consistent with ours. Id. 
at 257 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I would suppose . . . that the professional performers who had 
danced the minuet for 40 to 50 years would be better able to predict whether their favorite partners 
would follow them in the future than would an outsider, who might not know the difference between 
Haydn and Mozart.”). 
92 Id. at 228. 
93  Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 
ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 600 (1994). 
94 See, e.g., FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (enjoining a merger 
reducing the number of major firms three to two on a coordinated-effects theory); United States v. 
H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); see also In re Text Messaging Antitrust 
Litigation, 782 F.3d 867, 873-74 (7th Cir. 2015) (accepting that the oligopolists coordinated through 
leader-follower pricing but declining to infer an agreement among them in violation of the Sherman 
Act from circumstantial evidence). 
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evidence against the background of the Chicagoan presumption that 
oligopolies would be expected to compete strongly.95 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST MERGER ENFORCEMENT 
Notwithstanding the important prophylactic role of merger enforcement, 
in preventing coordinated effects that would be difficult to challenge under 
the antitrust laws after the fact, and notwithstanding developments in 
economic thinking that we have highlighted, coordination has received less 
attention in antitrust since the 1980s outside of cartel enforcement.96 This is 
evident in the way courts review mergers between rival hospitals. In an 
influential 1986 opinion upholding an FTC decision blocking a hospital 
merger, Judge Richard Posner explained that the “ultimate issue” in a 
horizontal merger case is “whether the challenged acquisition is likely to 
facilitate collusion.” 97  By contrast, in recent hospital merger cases, the 
primary if not sole competitive effects concern was with unilateral effects.98 
 
95 While the Court’s skepticism about the success of coordination in Brooke Group was offered 
as a reason not to expect oligopoly recoupment after predatory pricing, it has been understood more 
broadly. For example, the dissenting judges in the closely divided circuit court in Blomkest Fertilizer, 
Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), relied in part on Brooke Group when 
explaining that higher than competitive prices were implausible in an oligopoly absent an express 
agreement among rivals because coordination is difficult to achieve and sustain. Id. at 1041-42. 
96 Although it is not the focus of our analysis, we note that the courts have also made it more 
difficult to use Section 1 of the Sherman Act to challenge coordinated oligopoly outcomes. In 1986, 
the Supreme Court encouraged lower courts to consider the economic plausibility of allegations of 
conspiracy before inferring a horizontal agreement from circumstantial evidence and reject cases 
where the plaintiff cannot proffer evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility” of unilateral 
conduct. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 596-98 (1986). 
Although the alleged agreement involved a conspiracy to set prices below cost, a number of lower 
courts have applied Matsushita’s standards in cases involving alleged agreements to raise price. GAVIL 
ET AL., supra note 28, at 338. Matsushita’s call for an assessment of the economic plausibility of 
plaintiff ’s conspiracy evidence at the summary judgment stage of litigation has since been extended 
to the pleading stage of litigation. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-60 (2007). 
Since Matsushita, courts have commonly considered economic plausibility when deciding whether 
to infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence. E.g., Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. USS-
POSCO Indus., 803 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the alleged conspiracy is 
economically implausible because the “benefit of this scheme [to a critical alleged co-
conspirator]	. . . is just not apparent”); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1043-44 (noting 
“situational [plus] factors” including “market structure, motivation, and opportunity” that “make 
conspiracy possible”). With courts willing to accept dubious Chicagoan arguments skeptical that 
oligopolies can successfully reach coordinated outcomes, this seemingly neutral economic approach 
has in practice empowered defendants opposing meritorious coordination cases by giving them an 
opportunity they did not previously possess to press the arguments that persuaded the Chicagoans 
that coordinated oligopoly outcomes are hard to reach and sustain. 
97 Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.). 
98 E.g., ProMedica Health Sys. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 568-70 (6th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the 
unilateral effects of a merger between two hospitals in Ohio); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. 
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Coordinated effects of horizontal mergers have also been downplayed by 
the antitrust enforcement agencies. The agencies often focus on unilateral 
effects even in industries, such as airlines, with histories of coordinated 
outcomes. 99  We follow the widespread convention of classifying as a 
unilateral effect the possibility that all firms’ prices change—provided that 
none of the changes turn on the expected responses of rivals.100 
But the merger guidelines have evolved to reflect the changing economic 
understanding of coordination since the courts and enforcement agencies 
adopted Chicago school views. The 1982 Merger Guidelines were predicated 
on a Chicagoan view of oligopolistic coordination. 101  By contrast, the 
analytical framework governing coordinated effects set forth in the 1992 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines was rooted in the modern economics of 
coordination through purposive conduct,102 and the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
 
v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 786-87 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the post-merger entity’s 
power to negotiate higher rates of reimbursement and charge higher rates for ancillary services). 
99 Baker, supra note 7, at 116-17. In part, this likely reflects a shift in agency focus to unilateral 
effects. Unilateral effects became attractive in part because they gave the enforcement agencies a 
greater ability to understand and explain the mechanism by which competition would be harmed 
and because economists developed new empirical tools for analyzing unilateral effects that took 
advantage of new sources of data. Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace 
Unilateral Effects?, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31, 33-36 (2003). 
100 To address an often-confusing technical question, unilateral price increases can include 
nonstrategic responses of nonmerging rivals (such as price increases). In some common models used 
to simulate unilateral effects, notably static Nash equilibrium models where firms choose price or 
output, firms act as though they anticipate that rivals will not respond to their decisions but will 
react rationally to the fact of the merger, so nonmerging firms’ choices typically will change. We 
treat those effects of a merger in such Nash equilibrium models as our noncoordinated benchmark, 
and would classify those responses as unilateral, not coordinated. Unilateral effects do not assume 
that nonmerging firms’ prices (or outputs) remain constant, but they do assume that those firms 
pursue “unchanging strategies,” meaning roughly that each nonmerging firm’s price bears the same 
relationship to others’ (including the merging firms’) prices as it would have done absent the merger. 
See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in 
HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43, 43 (Paolo Buccirossi, ed. 2008) (suggesting that 
merger effects are “coordinated” only if they shift the (confusingly named) “reaction functions” of 
nonmerging parties, and using the language of “unilateral effects” to describe the outcome when 
nonmerging rivals respond to an anticipated price increase by the merged firm by raising price too, 
so long as the nonmerging firms pursue “unchanging strategies”). 
101 Paul T. Denis, Market Power in Antitrust Merger Analysis: Refining the Collusion Hypothesis, 60 
ANTITRUST L.J. 829, 829-30 (1992). Cf. William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman’s 
View, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 618, 626 (1983) (acknowledging the influence of Stigler’s analysis of 
oligopolies in the development of concentration standards). 
102 1992 HMG, supra note 14, at 18-22. More specifically, the discussion of coordinated effects in 
the 1992 Guidelines was based on the idea that coordinated outcomes were those subgame perfect 
equilibria of infinitely repeated games that are less competitive than static oligopoly outcomes. See 
Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, 1991, at 281, 291-92; Baker, supra note 7, at 152 n.16. 
These articles were written around the time that those authors worked on drafting the 1992 Guidelines. 
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Guidelines broadened the definition of coordinated effects further to 
incorporate nonpurposive strategic (“parallel accommodating”) conduct.103 
How should antitrust enforcers and courts address coordination when 
evaluating horizontal mergers in light of the modern economic literature? 
Here, we suggest that a detailed competitive effects analysis should turn on 
whether the coordinated effects concern principally involves purposive or 
nonpurposive strategic conduct. Enforcers should, of course, be open to both 
concerns, which are not mutually exclusive.104 
We emphasize, however, that both types of strategic conduct and resulting 
coordinated effects can be expected to be more likely or more substantial the 
greater the level and increase in market concentration. This supports a 
structural merger policy, by which market concentration statistics trigger a 
presumption of coordinated effects—while also suggesting more detailed 
ways of evaluating the likelihood of coordinated effects in the event the 
plaintiff ’s prima facie case based on concentration is not strong or successfully 
questioned by the merging firm defendants.105 
A. Coordinated Effects Involving Purposive Strategic Conduct 
In considering whether a merger would facilitate more effective purposive 
strategic conduct, we recommend that enforcers and courts look to identify 
mergers that weaken a constraint on the ability of coordinating firms to 
approach more closely the joint profit-maximizing outcome or make 
coordination more likely or more stable. This approach is suggested by 
 
103 2010 HMG, supra note 13, at 24-25 (identifying as “coordinated” effects conduct that is 
profitable only because of rival reactions, as in the 1992 Guidelines, while explicitly incorporating 
“parallel accommodating conduct” within that definition and distinguishing it from a “common 
understanding that is not explicitly negotiated but would be enforced by the detection and 
punishment of deviations that would undermine the coordinated interaction”); see Carl Shapiro, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. For Econ., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the ABA 
Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum: Update from the Antitrust Division27-28 (Nov. 18, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518246/download [https://perma.cc/ASZ6-C9KS] (explaining that 
the 2010 Merger Guidelines recognize parallel accommodating conduct as a form of coordination 
and providing an example). 
104 See supra note 18. For example, if pre-merger firms have reached coordinated outcomes 
short of joint profit-maximization through nonpurposive conduct, their merger could potentially 
facilitate purposive coordination (as well as make nonpurposive coordination more effective). 
105 Once the plaintiff has satisfied its initial burden of production in a horizontal merger case, the 
strength of defendants’ practical burden of persuasion varies on a sliding scale. “The more compelling 
the prima facie case,” which could be satisfied by relying on a presumption of competitive harm inferred 
from market concentration, “the more evidence the defendant must present to rebut it successfully.” 
United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Accord FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 
246 F.3d 708, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2001). One district court has interpreted this language to mean that as the 
plaintiff ’s prima facie case becomes more compelling, the defendant must show more to meet its burden 
of production (not just that the defendant must show more to meet its practical burden of persuasion). 
United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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economic models in which firms seek to approach that outcome (or another 
anticompetitive outcome) but are constrained in that attempt because they 
must reach consensus terms of coordination and deter cheating.106 In such 
models, coordination is constrained either by limitations on the incentive of 
coordinating firms to punish cheating or by the difficulties they face in 
identifying coordinated outcomes that would increase the pool of profits from 
exercising market power without reducing the profits obtained by any one of 
those firms. This approach allows the plaintiff to explain, and the court to 
understand, why the merger matters—and not simply to look to the structural 
presumption that associates higher concentration with greater odds of 
successful purposive coordination. 
Suppose, for example, that all firms sell a single product so 
interchangeable that one way or another all will charge the identical price. 
Thus, in practice, coordinating firms can improve the terms of coordination 
only by raising that price.107 All the firms would like the industry price to rise 
to some extent, but the high-price point that a firm would select—the highest 
the firm would want the uniform price to go before it would do better by 
cheating rather than going along with its rivals—would differ from firm to 
firm. A firm with a small market share and a greater ability to expand output 
inexpensively might prefer to cheat rather than accept the higher industry 
price that a firm with a high share and a high cost of expanding output would 
prefer the industry to adopt. 
In equilibrium, the coordinated price would be the lowest of those high-
price points: the lowest price that any individual firm would accept if it knew 
that its rivals would charge the identical price. The constraint on coordination 
would be the incentive of the firm M (for “maverick”) that prefers the lowest 
coordinated industry price not to raise the industry price further. If following 
a merger between firm M and a rival the merged firm prefers a higher price 
than did pre-merger firm M, that will relax the constraint on coordination 
previously imposed by firm M, leading prices to rise. 
In consequence, courts and enforcers should be concerned particularly 
about the coordination-enhancing potential of mergers that involve a 
maverick in an industry where coordination through purposive conduct is 
 
106 More technically, we are working within the economic framework of oligopoly repeated 
games as it is usually interpreted in antitrust economics, although in pure game theory there is no 
assumption that players seek any particular outcome. 
107 This simplifying assumption, made for expositional convenience, rules out the possibility 
that the firms would, for example, choose different prices for different firms, or pay high cost firms 
to reduce output more than low cost firms. Nothing of consequence in the example would change if 
prices differed across firms, perhaps reflecting differences in product quality, and the firms preserved 
those price differences when increasing their prices. 
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ongoing or appears feasible.108 Although the term “maverick” has been used 
loosely, confusing the district court in H&R Block,109 we refer to a setting in 
which firms would cheat by cutting its price to below the coordinated price. 
In this setting, a maverick is a firm that is most apt to be the binding 
constraint on coordination, as by being nearly indifferent between going 
along with a high coordinated price and cheating on that price.110 In the above 
example, the maverick is the firm that prefers the lowest coordinated price 
and will keep the coordinated price from increasing further simply by 
refusing to go along. As the example suggests, a merger involving a maverick 
may relax the maverick’s constraint on the effectiveness of industry 
coordination, leading to higher prices. 
A maverick, according to our definition, can be identified in a number of 
ways.111 For example, a firm is likely to be considered a maverick if it has 
actually declined to go along with recent attempts by others to raise the 
coordinated price.112 If other firms foresee such behavior, they may avoid 
attempts to raise the price.113 A maverick may be identified by structural 
features that make it less willing than its rivals to go along with more 
ambitious coordination, such as a small share and substantial ability to expand 
output inexpensively.114 A maverick could also be identified when industry 
prices respond to factors that affect its own marginal costs but not the costs 
 
108 See generally, Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated 
Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135 (2002) (explaining how 
coordinated competitive effects analysis can be reconstructed around the role of a maverick firm that 
constrains prices when industry coordination is incomplete). For enforcement examples see, e.g., 
Complaint, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBEV SA/NV (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 13-00127); FCC 
Staff Analysis and Findings, In re Applications of AT&T, Inc. & Deutsche Telekom AG, WT Docket 
No. 11–65 (Nov. 29, 2011). 
109  H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 79-80. The court rejected the term as confusing but 
nevertheless found anticompetitive coordinated effects on the ground that the merger involved the 
acquisition of a firm that played the role of a maverick by our definition. Id. 
110 It is also possible that firms would deviate by declining to punish cheating rivals (cheating 
on the “punishment state”). Then a maverick would be nearly indifferent to participating in the 
punishment of cheaters. 
111 Others employ the term maverick more broadly to also include a firm that competes more 
aggressively than its rivals, including when oligopolists are not coordinating through repeated 
interaction. See, e.g., John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Private Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Non-
Cournot and Maverick Behavior, 7 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 403, 410 (1989) (describing maverick firms 
as those firms with “a particularly small conjectural variation, causing output expansiveness in its 
industry” or a firm “whose demise results in an increase in the remaining firms’ conjectural 
variations”) (emphasis omitted). 
112 See Baker, supra note 108, at 174 (describing behaviors associated with maverick firms). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 175-76. 
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of its rivals. 115 Different firms can be mavericks at different times or on 
different competitive dimensions.116 
The potential for a merger involving a maverick to enhance oligopoly 
coordination links growing concentration from the reduction in the number 
of significant rivals with competitive harm. The odds that a randomly selected 
merger among market participants involves a maverick increase as the number 
of significant rivals falls—and even that calculation would understate the 
likelihood given the incentive of firms to make acquisitions that facilitate 
coordination.117 This link supports a structural presumption of coordinated 
harm from horizontal mergers when strategic conduct is purposive.118 
B. Coordinated Effects Involving Nonpurposive Strategic Conduct 
A merger could also create coordinated effects, and therefore harm 
competition, by affecting nonpurposive strategic conduct. If, as a result of a 
merger, oligopolists engaging in nonpurposive strategic conduct change their 
expectations of the way their rivals will naturally or predictably respond in 
the competitive and market environment, the coordinated outcome can 
change. Coordinated effects arise when the new coordinated outcome is 
worse for buyers. 
In order to explain how a merger can create coordinated effects when 
strategic conduct is nonpurposive, we distinguish two ways that rivals may 
naturally respond, which we term reinforcing and diluting. We say that rivals’ 
reactions in the industry are “reinforcing” when they go in the same direction 
(e.g., rivals’ reactions to a price cut generally involve price cuts) and 
“diluting” when they go in opposite directions (e.g., rivals’ reactions to a 
 
115 Id. at 174-75 (describing how the market price will change if a maverick firm’s marginal costs 
rise or fall). 
116 When challenging the US Airways/American merger, the government alleged that the 
merger would enhance coordination on two different dimensions: with US Airways a maverick on 
one dimension (involving discounted connecting fares) and American a maverick on the other 
(involving aggregate capacity). See Amended Complaint at 17-19, 26, United States v. U.S. Airways 
Grp., Inc. (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-01236) (describing US Airways as offering connecting service at 
a substantial discount to the nonstop service of other airlines on the same routes, while other airlines 
generally do not undercut the nonstop fares of their rivals, and describing American’s standalone 
expansion plan as undermining the industry’s capacity discipline). 
117 See Baker, supra note 108, at 198 (“[T]he fewer the number of significant sellers, the more 
likely it is that the loss of any one would be the loss of a firm that constrains coordinated conduct.”). 
118 While we have emphasized the way increased concentration or the loss of a maverick from 
merger enhance the prospects for purposive coordination, they are not the only way mergers can make 
purposive coordination more likely or more effective. Mergers may also do so by making it easier to 
identify terms of coordination or increasing the speed or extent of punishments for cheating, for 
example by increasing the transparency of prices or increasing symmetry among firms. See supra notes 
35 and 88 and accompanying text. Factors such as these may facilitate the exercise of purposive 
coordination even when firms were coordinating nonpurposively before the merger. See supra note 104. 
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capacity increase generally involve capacity reductions). 119  As our 
hypothetical examples will demonstrate, a merger will create an adverse 
coordinated effect when strategic conduct is nonpurposive and the merger 
would be expected to strengthen reinforcing reactions or weaken diluting 
reactions. The examples suggest market features that courts and enforcers 
could look for to identify mergers with coordination-enhancing potential. But 
the analysis of coordinated effects of mergers involving nonpurposive 
strategic conduct is in its infancy, and we expect that more such possibilities 
will become evident over time. 
1. Reinforcing Reactions 
When the relevant reactions are reinforcing, competitive harm would be 
expected if the merger strengthens those reactions by making them sharper, 
more prompt, or more likely. Suppose that price reactions are reinforcing: a 
firm contemplating a price cut expects its rivals to cut their prices in response 
and a firm contemplating a price increase expects its rivals to respond by 
raising their prices. It is plausible that the expectation of reinforcing reactions 
will discourage the firm from reducing prices and encourage it to increase 
prices. A merger that makes those reactions stronger or more certain will tend 
to harm buyers. As such, a merger will more strongly discourage price 
reductions and more strongly encourage price increases. 
We think it is often plausible that a horizontal merger will strengthen 
reinforcing nonpurposive reactions. The merged firm is necessarily a larger part 
of its rivals’ competitive environment than were the merging parties before the 
merger. In an industry with four comparably significant firms, for example, any 
one firm might cut its price with the expectation that, for each of the other 
three, the competitive environment would remain predominantly as it was 
before the price cut, limiting those rivals’ natural and predictable reinforcing 
responses. That expectation could change with a merger, strengthening their 
responses and thereby leading to a higher coordinated price. 
To illustrate the way reinforcing reactions can strengthen as the number 
of firms shrink, suppose that in this industry, firms respond to price changes 
by rivals with a lag, and that when a responding firm adjusts its price, it 
matches an average of all other firms’ prices.120 Then, in a four-firm industry, 
if one firm lowers its price, it will take several time lags before the other firms’ 
 
119 In the discussion here, we assume (as is the case when prices or capacities are decision 
variables) that an increase by one firm either benefits consumers and harms rivals or vice versa. If 
we allowed for a decision variable that has same-sign effects on consumers and rivals, our discussion 
would become more cumbersome. 
120 See Brown & MacKay, supra note 62, at 1 n.3 (indicating that in practice, pricing algorithms 
typically adjust prices based on the average price of a set of competitors). 
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prices come into near parity with the first mover’s. Meanwhile, the price 
cutter will be attracting more customers, who may remain its customers when 
price parity is (approximately) restored. Under such circumstances, the first 
firm’s price reduction could be profitable. By contrast, if the industry shrinks 
to two firms, and the duopolists employ the same behavioral rule, a price cut 
by one firm would promptly lead its rival to match in full, likely making price-
cutting unprofitable. 
The basic insight from the example does not rely on its specific behavioral 
pattern. The example shows, based on intuitively plausible mechanics, that a 
firm in an industry with a somewhat competitive market structure may expect 
its price movements to be only partially matched or matched only with a lag, 
while a firm in a more concentrated industry may expect such matching to be 
prompter and fuller. The faster and stronger reactions in the more 
concentrated industry would be expected to discourage price-cutting and 
encourage price increases.121 
This example illustrates how a merger that increases concentration 
significantly when reactions are reinforcing can lead sellers to hold back from 
procompetitive actions for nonpurposive strategic reasons—more precisely, 
to hold back more than they did before—thereby harming buyers. As the 2010 
Merger Guidelines state, 
A market typically is more vulnerable to coordinated conduct if a firm’s 
prospective competitive reward from attracting customers away from its 
rivals will be significantly diminished by likely responses of those rivals. This 
is more likely to be the case, the stronger and faster are the responses the firm 
anticipates from its rivals. The firm is more likely to anticipate strong 
responses if there are few significant competitors	.	.	.	.122 
The insight from the example links expected responses to the level of market 
concentration. It thus supports a structural presumption of harm from horizontal 
merger when strategic conduct is nonpurposive and reactions are reinforcing. 
2. Diluting Reactions 
In other industries—for example, ones in which firms compete primarily 
by setting output levels or choosing capacities—it may be reasonable to expect 
diluting reactions, not reinforcing ones. 123  Firms contemplating reducing 
 
121 If responses are also more certain in the more concentrated industry, that feature, too, would 
be expected to discourage price-cutting and encourage price increases. 
122 2010 HMG, supra note 13, at 26. 
123 When the reactions in question tend to dilute the initial competitive impact of a change, those 
reactions will often make the industry more competitive than a static Nash analysis would predict. A 
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output or capacity may be more likely to expect rivals to expand output or 
capacity in response rather than to pull back, and firms increasing capacity 
may be more likely to expect rivals to postpone their own capacity increases. 
In such an industry, harm may arise if a merger weakens the firms’ diluting 
responses. This might happen for at least two reasons. First, the merged firm 
faces fewer rivals, with less total capacity, than did either pre-merger partner. 
Therefore, when deciding whether to cut back its output, the firm may expect 
a more muted output expansion by rivals than before. Second, ordinary 
unilateral effects will often reduce the merged firm’s profit-maximizing 
output. If that shift also reduces the firm’s profit-maximizing change in 
output in response to a nonmerging firm’s output reduction (relative to the 
aggregate response of the merging firms prior to the merger), the nonmerging 
firms will anticipate a weaker diluting response to their own output changes 
and will thus be encouraged to reduce their output. 
For example, consider a merger in an industry with a relatively 
homogenous product, where the firms have fixed capacities and rising 
marginal costs of production. The merger of two fairly large rivals would be 
expected to create a firm that has a unilateral incentive to reduce output in 
order to increase the industry price. One reason is that the merged firm would 
have a greater base of sales on which to profit from a higher industry price. 
A second reason is that the merged firm would recognize that less industry 
capacity is in the hands of other firms. The acquired firm’s capacity would no 
longer be used to expand output in response to an output reduction by the 
merged firm. Thus, the merged firm would expect the magnitude of the 
aggregate supply response it would face if it were to raise prices would be 
reduced (relative to the supply response the merger partners previously 
faced). Moreover, that reaction is natural and predictable, so nonmerging 
rivals would understand that the merged firm’s incentives have changed. Each 
nonmerging firm would assume that the merged firm would not expand 
output much, if at all, in the event the nonmerging firm reduces output, 
giving each an incentive to raise price.124 The upshot is that after the merger, 
all firms would have a greater incentive than before to reduce output and 
increase prices, making competitive harm from merger likely.125 
 
merger that weakens such reactions will harm competition even if the post-merger industry remains 
more competitive than a static Nash analysis (given the post-merger market structure) suggests. 
124 In terms of the decomposition proposed by Landes and Posner, the merger in the above 
example increases the merged firm’s market power by reducing the elasticity of nonmerging rival 
supply. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
937, 945 (1981) (explaining that the higher the elasticity of rival supply, the less a firm’s market power). 
125 See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement at 1, 9-10, United States v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 
1:12–cv–00227 (D.D.C. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f280100/280135.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9J9J-3V5L] (arguing that the merger would result in a loss of competition and thus result 
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The example illustrates how a horizontal merger that increases 
concentration substantially when reactions are diluting can weaken those 
reactions and thus make firms more willing to accommodate price increases. 
Under such circumstances, the firms would be expected to increase prices. 
The example also links a weakening of expected supply responses, and greater 
risk of competitive harm, to an increased level of market concentration—
thereby supporting a structural presumption of harm from horizontal mergers 
when strategic conduct is nonpurposive and reactions are diluting. 
3. Concluding Comments on the Coordinated Effects of Mergers 
Just as a horizontal merger could simultaneously create unilateral and 
coordinated competitive effects,126 a horizontal merger could simultaneously 
create coordinated competitive effects through its effect on both purposive 
and nonpurposive conduct. In addition to the familiar effects on purposive 
coordination, industry firms could be led to act less aggressively by 
strengthening reinforcing nonpurposive reactions or weakening diluting 
nonpurposive reactions. In other cases, though, one coordination theory will 
be more plausible than the other or a merger may have opposing effects on 
the prospects for coordination through the two types of conduct.127 
Our analysis of mergers shows that regardless of whether coordinated 
outcomes arise from purposive or nonpurposive strategic conduct, coordination 
will often become more likely or more effective as the number of firms in an 
industry shrinks. A merger is more likely to involve a maverick, and thereby 
enhance coordination, as the number of significant rivals falls.128 Similarly, as 
concentration grows, firms will react differently to a larger merged firm’s 
strategic moves than they previously did to smaller rivals’ moves—potentially 
enhancing coordination by strengthening reinforcing nonpurposive strategic 
conduct and weakening diluting nonpurposive strategic conduct. 129 
Accordingly, a structural presumption makes sense with respect to both ways 
of thinking about strategic conduct and coordinated outcomes. 
 
in higher prices and lower output in the United States by leading the merged firm to reduce output 
strategically and leading nonmerging rivals to respond by increasing prices). 
126  E.g., Miller, Sheu & Weinberg, supra note 5, at 29 (identifying both unilateral and 
coordinated competitive effects of a horizontal merger through a simulation model). 
127 For example, if a merger leads to less competitive reactions, thus enhancing nonpurposive 
coordination, and if the most plausible punishment strategies for purposive coordination involve 
reversion to the one-shot interaction, the merger could simultaneously reduce the prospects for 
purposive coordination by making punishment less severe. To similar effect, if the merger makes 
prices more transparent, the merger can facilitate purposive coordination, see supra note 118, and it 
may strengthen reinforcing nonpurposive conduct. 
128 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra Section III.B. 
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In our view, the plausibility of persistent coordinated conduct in oligopoly 
markets combined with the limitations in the precision of our predictive tools 
strengthens the case for a structural merger policy, by which coordinated 
effects are presumed when a horizontal merger increases concentration 
significantly in a concentrated market. Since the structural presumption was 
introduced in the 1960s,130 its strength has eroded, in part due to Chicago 
school skepticism about the likelihood and sustainability of oligopolistic 
coordination. 131  As courts come to recognize that coordination is a 
substantially greater concern in modern economics than it appeared to 
Chicago-oriented commentators and courts, they can be expected to 
strengthen the presumption by requiring stronger rebuttal evidence for any 
given concentration level and increase.132 
CONCLUSION 
Coordinated oligopoly outcomes arise when firm conduct is substantially 
influenced by the prospect of rivals’ reactions. Reactions can be purposive, 
designed to punish cheating from consensus terms of coordination, but they 
need not be. They can also be nonpurposive: natural and predictable 
responses to the change in a firm’s competitive environment when one of its 
rivals makes a competitive move such as a price change. We do not suppose 
that either purposive or nonpurposive coordination is inevitable in oligopoly 
markets, nor that it invariably raises price substantially above the nonstrategic 
benchmark. But, as we have demonstrated, coordinated oligopoly outcomes 
are common and harmful. 
While we have stressed the broad scope of strategic conduct and 
coordinated outcomes, we have also explained that even narrowly defined 
“coordination” is not as difficult and unlikely as Chicago-oriented courts and 
commentators suppose. Criminal convictions for illegal collusion are surely 
the tip of that iceberg, and are themselves not rare. 
 
130 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (indicating that a merger which 
produces a firm controlling a high market share and results in a significant increase in market 
concentration is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined 
absent evidence clearly showing otherwise). 
131 Baker, supra note 7, at 77-80. The nadir was the influential Baker Hughes decision of the D.C. 
Circuit, handed down in 1990, which described concentration as simply “a convenient starting point” 
for a “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis, United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), and explicitly disclaimed a requirement that defendants make a “clear showing” to 
rebut the inference of competitive harm. Id. at 992. 
132 For a complementary analysis and a discussion of legislative options for strengthening the 
structural presumption, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market 
Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). See also Baker, supra note 7, at 77-79 
(justifying the structural presumption based on an error-cost analysis). 
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In short, coordination is a serious concern in oligopoly, underrated by the 
Chicagoans and those influenced by their skepticism. Particularly when 
Sherman Act enforcement against coordination would be weak or 
inappropriate, but not only then, merger policy should be alert to the risks of 
coordinated effects, broadly construed, and rely on a strengthened structural 
presumption in horizontal merger analysis to help control those risks. 
 
